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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
       
 s Al Qaeda has dispersed, the precise definition of an “organized 
armed group” (OAG) under the law of armed conflict (LOAC) has be-
come increasingly vital. The United States currently targets certain mem-
bers of Al Qaeda and affiliated organizations not only in Afghanistan, but 
also in other countries.1 However, while the elements of Al Qaeda that 
were present in Afghanistan immediately after September 11 presumably 
constituted an OAG, it is less clear that supposed affiliates outside Afghan-
                                                                                                                      
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University. I thank Laurie Blank, Geoff Corn and 
Rebecca Ingber for comments on a previous draft.  
1. See John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Coun-
terterrorism, Remarks at the Harvard Law School Program on Law and Security: Strength-
ening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-st 
rengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Ad-
viser, U.S. Department of State, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society 
of International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), 
available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm; cf. Robert M. 
Chesney, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counter-
terrorism, __ MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2138623, at 14–16 (discussing dilemmas in cross-border targeting decisions). 
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istan are part of the same OAG. The issue raises the stakes of targeting de-
cisions. If affiliated groups are part of an OAG under the Al Qaeda “um-
brella,” then arguably the United States has the right to target them wher-
ever they are.2 But if groups outside Afghanistan are not part of Al Qaeda, 
then targeting them requires a separate armed conflict and a separate jus ad 
bellum justification for the use of force.3 Formulating and applying the 
OAG criteria is therefore an essential enterprise.   
This article responds to the high-stakes challenge with a pragmatic ap-
proach4 along two axes. First, it argues for a broad interpretation of the 
definition of “organized armed group” framed by the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Prosecutor v. Tadic.5 In 
practice, while the language of the definition appears to be narrow, case law 
and scholarship have often expanded the concept. Second, the article 
shows that terrorist groups generally, and Al Qaeda in particular, reveal a 
surprising degree of organization. Some of this organization takes uncon-
ventional forms, dictated by the special circumstances of terrorist net-
works. Yet terrorist groups actually have many of the same organizational 
needs as States, including the pervasive need to control agency costs. 
Moreover, Al Qaeda exists in a synergistic relationship with many regional 
groups, providing training and influencing their choice of targets. Strategic 
influence of this type is a sufficient justification for targeting affiliates. 
This article proceeds in two parts. Part I outlines the lessons of case 
law and commentary regarding the definition of OAG. This part suggests 
                                                                                                                      
2. If the State in which the group is currently located is willing and able to deal with 
the threat, the United States should defer to that State’s efforts. See Ashley S. Deeks, “Un-
willing or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VIRGINIA 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 483, 499–503 (2012) (exploring “unwilling or unable” 
test based on law of neutrality); cf. Karl S. Chang, Enemy Status and Military Detention in the 
War Against Al-Qaeda, 47 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 1, 25–36 (2011) (con-
sulting neutrality law to define “enemy” who can be targeted or detained); Rebecca Ingber, 
Untangling Belligerency from Neutrality in the Conflict with Al Qaeda, 47 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL 
LAW JOURNAL 75 (2011) (cautioning that neutrality law does not provide useful guide for 
detention of non-State actors in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs)). 
3. See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 204–11 (4th ed. 
2005). 
4. See generally MICHAEL J. GLENNON, THE FOG OF LAW: PRAGMATISM, SECURITY, 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (2010) (recommending “broader and more flexible inter-
pretive method”).  
5. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defence Motion for In-
terlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 
2, 1995). 
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that the language used may seem narrow, but has often been interpreted in 
a more flexible fashion. Part II discusses the status as OAGs of terrorist 
groups in general and Al Qaeda in particular. It concludes that such groups 
often possess the degree of organization required for recognition under the 
laws of armed conflict. Furthermore, Al Qaeda as a network often exercis-
es strategic influence on its affiliates that justifies targeting.  
 
II. ORGANIZING THE CASE LAW ON OAGS 
 
Both case law and evolving trends on the ground have precipitated the 
problem of trans-regional conflicts and organized armed groups. State con-
flicts with organized non-State actors are considered conflicts not of an 
international character (NIACs).6 At least at first blush, one would assume 
that a NIAC can take place only on the territory of a single State; if the ter-
ritory of more than one State is involved, it seems incongruous to deny the 
“international character” of the conflict.7 Moreover, treaties and case law 
have required that at least one party to an armed conflict be an OAG. Ad-
ditional Protocol II (AP II) defines OAG in a narrow way. According to 
AP II, OAGs must be “under responsible command, [and] exercise such 
control over a part of [a State’s] territory as to enable them to carry out sus-
tained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.”8 
                                                                                                                      
6. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628–32 (2006). 
7. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANI-
TARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 10 (2011), 
available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/31st-
international-conference/31-int-conference-LOAC-challenges-report-11-5-1-2-en.pdf [he 
reinafter IHL CHALLENGES] (discussing “multinational NIACs [in which] . . . multination-
al armed forces are fighting alongside the armed forces of a ‘host’ state—in its territory—
against one or more organized armed groups” as well as “transnational” conflict between 
“Al Qaeda and its ‘affiliates’ and ‘adherents’ and the United States”); see generally Kenneth 
Watkin, “Small Wars”: The Legal Challenges, in NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3 (Kenneth Watkin & Andrew J. Norris eds., 2012) (Vol. 
88, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies) (discussing dilemmas in conflicts 
against non-State actors); cf. Geoffrey Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Transnational Armed Con-
flict: A “Principled” Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42 ISRAEL 
LAW REVIEW 1, 10–12 (2009) (arguing that NIAC concept does not fit well in analyzing 
conflicts involving global terrorist network such as Al Qaeda and suggesting “transnation-
al armed conflict” as a superior alternative). 
8. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, art. 1(1), June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
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Some groups, like Hamas in Gaza or the now-defunct Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka, might meet this definition, but a net-
work such as Al Qaeda will not. Al Qaeda’s dispersion therefore makes 
precise definition a priority.   
 
A. The High Stakes of LOAC Definitions 
 
Much hinges on the breadth of the definition of a NIAC. A narrow defini-
tion subjects State forces to the more rigorous demands of international 
human rights law (IHRL), which permits the use of deadly force only when 
an individual poses a concrete, imminent threat to the life of a law en-
forcement officer or other individuals.9 The European Court of Human 
Rights has defined such threats narrowly, second-guessing the use of lethal 
force by law enforcement even when the target was a pair of known terror-
ists whom authorities rightly believed had planted an explosive device to be 
triggered in the near future.10 Under IHRL, terrorists have a greater oppor-
tunity to operate with impunity. Applying LOAC, in contrast, diminishes 
the non-State actor’s room to maneuver. It allows States to target individu-
als whom it believes to be performing a continuous combat function 
(CCF).11 Even narrow definitions of CCF recognize that an individual who 
                                                                                                                      
9. See McCann v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97 (1995); 
Geoffrey S. Corn, Extraterritorial Law Enforcement or Transnational Counterterrorist Operations: 
The Stakes of Two Models, in NEW BATTLEFIELDS, OLD LAWS: CRITICAL DEBATES ON 
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 23, 35 (William C. Banks ed., 2011) (analyzing the relationship 
between LOAC and law enforcement paradigms); John B. Bellinger III & Vijay M. Pad-
manabhan, Detention Operations in Contemporary Conflicts: Four Challenges for the Geneva Conven-
tions and Other Existing Law, 105 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 201, 210–
13 (2011) (same); see also Evan J. Criddle, Proportionality in Counterinsurgency: A Relational The-
ory, 87 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 1073 (2012) (arguing that IHRL paradigm fits most 
cases involving violence by a State’s nationals within a State’s own territory); David Luban, 
Military Lawyering and the Two Cultures Problem, 25 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW __ (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2054832 (asserting that 
law of armed conflict shows insufficient regard for welfare of civilians and that human 
rights law is superior in this respect); cf. Monica Hakimi, A Functional Approach to Targeting 
and Detention, 110 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 1365 (2012) (arguing for functional criteria that 
transcend distinction between LOAC and IHRL).  
10. See McCann, App. No. 18984/91 ¶¶ 7–22 (Ryssdal, J., dissenting); cf. Peter Margu-
lies, Valor’s Vices: Against a State Duty to Risk Forces in Armed Conflict, in SHAPING A GLOBAL 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN ASYMMETRIC 
WARFARE 87, 99 (William C. Banks ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2013) (critiquing McCann). 
11. See HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The Govern-
ment of Israel, ¶ 39 [2006] (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007 
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performs this role may spend much time in pursuits other than presenting 
a concrete, imminent threat to the other side. A typical uniformed soldier, 
for example, may spend time marching, building an encampment or even 
sleeping. The soldier can be targeted by an enemy State’s forces in any and 
all of these activities.12 Just as a State can target an opposing State’s uni-
formed forces without a showing that an individual soldier faces a specific, 
imminent threat, LOAC would allow targeting of a member of an armed 
group whom the State reasonably believed to be engaged in a CCF.  
However, the greater latitude allowed States in targeting terrorists 
makes human rights advocates blanch at the prospect of higher civilian 
casualties.13 More latitude in targeting may increase the risk of mistakes, in 
                                                                                                                      
/A34/02007690.a34.pdf%20 (asserting that fighters who makes themselves regularly 
available to terrorist groups for acts of violence are directly participating in hostilities for 
such time as they make themselves available; any interlude between acts of violence is 
merely “preparation” for further violence). In this analysis, the PCAT Court lent a flexible 
reading to concepts that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has de-
fined more narrowly. See NILS MELZER, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED 
CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOS-
TILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 54 (2009), available at 
http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/20/Legal%20Conference/ICRC_002_0990.pdf (argu-
ing that terrorist bomb maker would be immune from targeting when not making bombs); 
see also Gabor Rona, US Targeted Killing Policy Unjustified, JURIST (Feb. 24, 2012), 
http://jurist.org/hotline /2012/02/gabor-rona-targeted-killing.php (criticizing United 
States’ targeting standards as unduly broad); but see Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct 
Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLITICS 697, 731 (2010) (criticizing narrow reading in ICRC 
Guidance); Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct 
Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW & POLITICS 641, 661 (2010) (criticizing ICRC’s failure to dismantle 
“revolving door” mechanism for terrorist groups). 
12. See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH 
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 143 (1977); but see Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of 
Soldiers, 2 JOURNAL OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 115, 138–50 (2010) (questioning whether use of 
lethal force should always be permissible against uniformed combatants).  
13. See Jens David Ohlin, The Duty to Capture, 97 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW (forth-
coming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2131720. Although the definition of an 
OAG is relevant to targeting decisions, the targeting debate also raises other issues beyond 
the scope of this article. Compare Kenneth Anderson, Efficiency In Bello and Ad Bellum: 
Making the Use of Force Too Easy?, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN 
ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 374, 391–96 (Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin & Andrew 
Altman eds., 2012) (rejecting argument that sophisticated technology behind drones that 
makes targeted killing easier also undermines practical checks on willingness to wage war); 
Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar Al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the International 
Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, 13 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3 
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which a State erroneously targets innocents or causes collateral damage 
among civilians.14 Advocates of greater State latitude will argue that States 
can and should build in systems that minimize mistakes, such as a lawyer’s 
review and approval of targeting decisions. However, State advocates 
would add, opponents of State latitude have a bad case of hindsight bias15 
regarding State action. State critics regard all civilian casualties as avoidable, 
a position that the law of war has never taken. However, proponents of 
State latitude would argue, critics fail to consider matters from an ex ante 
perspective, involving the incentives for violent non-State actors. When 
violent non-State actors believe they can operate with impunity, risks to 
civilians increase.16 Curbing violent non-State actors thus reduces net risks 
for civilians.  
                                                                                                                      
(2011) (suggesting that targeted killing under certain conditions is consistent with LOAC); 
Peter Margulies, The Fog of War Reform: Change and Structure in the Law of Armed Conflict After 
September 11, 95 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW 1417, 1471–77 (2012) (same); Jordan J. Paust, 
Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 
JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 237 (2010) (asserting that targeted killing is 
legal under international law as long as targeting force observes principles of distinction 
and proportionality), with PHILIP ALSTON, HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE 
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON EXTRAJUDICIAL, SUMMARY OR ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS (2010) 
(arguing that targeted killing in State that is not geographic site of armed conflict violates 
international law); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study 
of Pakistan, 2004–2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: THE LAW GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE IN 
CONTEXT (Simon Bronitt ed., 2011); cf. Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A 
Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside the “Hot” Conflict Zone, 161 UNIVERSITY OF 
PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW __ (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=2049532 (suggesting additional guidelines to regulate targeted killings). 
14. But see JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESI-
DENCY AFTER 9/11, at 131 (2012) (noting involvement of military lawyers in targeting 
decisions as check on errors); Gregory McNeal, Are Targeted Killings Unlawful: A Case Study 
in Empirical Claims Without Empirical Evidence, in TARGETED KILLINGS, supra note 13, at 
326, 331–42 (discussing process engaged in by U.S. military prior to authorization of 
drone strike). 
15. See Neal J. Roese, Twisted Pair: Counterfactual Thinking and the Hindsight Bias, in 
BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 258, 260–61 (Derek J. 
Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2004) (describing hindsight bias as “tendency to believe that 
an event was predictable before it occurred, even though for the perceiver it was not” and 
that harm was avoidable even when it was impossible to prevent). 
16. See Margulies, supra note 10; Michael W. Lewis, Drones and the Boundaries of the Bat-
tlefield, 47 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 293 (2012) (suggesting that narrow geo-
graphic restrictions on States’ ability to target terrorist groups with global operations 
would grant these groups asymmetric advantage). 
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Moreover, State critics often do not acknowledge that while a broader 
definition of OAG confers advantages on a State in the arena of targeting, 
with that advantage comes greater accountability for all parties to the NI-
AC.17 A State in a NIAC must observe the strictures of the Geneva Con-
ventions’ Common Article 3, such as humane treatment of captives.18 
These provisions are generally considered jus cogens and therefore non–
derogable.19 OAGs incur the same duties; one purpose of the requirement 
that a group have a minimum level of organization is that it would be un-
fair to require a disorganized group to observe LOAC without possessing 
the structure to do so. Individuals who target civilians can be made to an-
swer for violations of municipal law, such as the prohibition on murder. In 
contrast, OAGs who target civilians may be prosecuted in international 
tribunals for crimes against humanity, instead of merely being answerable 
in the sometimes dysfunctional justice systems of their countries of origin. 
The targeting advantages reaped by States are thus paid for by greater ac-
countability elsewhere in the LOAC framework.20 
 
B. Unpacking the ICTY Formulation 
 
At first blush, State critics may have an edge in the definitional debate re-
garding OAG. Some passages in case law have propounded a narrow defi-
nition of OAG that requires something approaching the attributes of 
States.21 In Prosecutor v. Limaj, the ICTY suggested that to meet its criteria, 
an OAG should have a headquarters, a unified command and a military 
                                                                                                                      
17. See Ohlin, supra note 13, at 21–22. 
18. See Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 
3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
19. IHRL provisions are often subject to derogation. Cf. IHL CHALLENGES, supra 
note 7, at 15 (describing applicability and scope of IHRL, particularly extraterritorial ap-
plicability, as “work in progress”).  
20. See United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent Interna-
tional Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/21/50, ¶ 
134 (Aug. 16, 2012), available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A-
HRC-21-50_en.pdf (noting accountability under LOAC of anti-government armed groups 
in Syria) [hereinafter U.N.H.C.R., Independent International Commission Report]. 
21. See Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 113–
117 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Limaj]; cf. 
Jelena Pejic, The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More than Meets the Eye, 93(881) INTER-
NATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 189, 191–92 (2011) (noting factors). 
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police unit that will arrest malefactors.22 Without these attributes, a group is 
considered to be a criminal band or an assemblage of individuals engaged 
in civil unrest such as a riot, rather than an OAG.23 Individuals in such 
groups cannot be targeted as readily as participants in an armed conflict, 
but instead are protected by IHRL.  
Acts of terrorism sit uneasily within this paradigm. “[I]solated acts of 
terrorism” probably do not demonstrate the level of organization required 
for a NIAC.24 Moreover, some commentators have noted that several ma-
jor nations have addressed significant acts of terrorism through traditional 
law enforcement means.25   
If a terrorist entity can elude definition as an OAG within one State, it 
can even more readily elude such definition in the regional or global con-
text. The United States confronts extremist organizations with varying de-
grees of closeness to Al Qaeda in multiple regions. Some have argued that 
Al Qaeda’s relationship to such groups involves only “very loose ties” typi-
cal of a “confederation of like-minded fellow travelers, many of whom are 
fighting separate armed conflicts in different regions of the globe.”26 
                                                                                                                      
22. Limaj, supra note 21, ¶ 113–17; see also Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-
4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 626 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998) (“re-
sponsible command” entails “degree of organization [that permits the group] . . . to plan 
and carry out concerted military operations, and to impose discipline”; group must also 
“dominate a sufficient part of territory” and “operations must be continuous and 
planned”). 
23. In some cases, a criminal enterprise may be so organized and its violence against 
State officials so intense that classification as a NIAC is appropriate. See Carina Bergal, 
Note, The Mexican Drug War: The Case for a Non-International Armed Conflict Classification, 34 
FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 1042 (2011). 
24. See Prosecutor v. Boskoski & Tarculovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Trial Chamber 
Judgment, ¶ 190 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008) [hereinafter 
Boskoski]. 
25. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, FINAL REPORT ON THE MEANING OF 
ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (2010); cf. Kim Lane Scheppele, The Inter-
national Standardization of National Security Law, 4 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & 
POLICY 437, 451 (2010) (asserting that global counterterrorism measures permit States to 
disguise substandard governance as counterterrorism); Sudha Setty, Comparative Perspectives 
on Specialized Trials for Terrorism, 63 MAINE LAW REVIEW 131, 153 (2010) (suggesting that 
counterterrorism policies in United States, United Kingdom and India raise human rights 
concerns). 
26. See Jens David Ohlin, Targeting Co-Belligerents, in TARGETED KILLINGS, supra note 
13, at 60, 75 (emphasis added) (noting this view while not necessarily endorsing it); Craig 
Martin, Going Medieval: Targeted Killing, Self-Defense and the Jus ad Bellum Regime, in TARGET-
ED KILLINGS, supra note 13, at 223, 245–46 (suggesting that groups with nominal Al 
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Treaty law and the ICTY jurisprudence actually permit greater flexibil-
ity in the definition of OAGs. While AP II applies to some NIACs, other 
NIACs are governed by Common Article 3, which contains no require-
ment that a party control territory.27 The International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC), a group with special competence regarding LOAC, has 
also signaled that flexibility is important. In one study, the ICRC observed 
that to be considered an OAG, an entity should merely have a “minimum 
of organization.”28 That terminology strongly suggests that a rigid, itemized 
checklist would be counterproductive.29  
Moreover, the ICTY jurisprudence is far more flexible than it may ap-
pear.30 In Prosecutor v. Boskoski & Tarculovski,31 a case involving the targeting 
of civilians by a non-State group, the ICTY noted that terrorist acts could 
form a pattern that would constitute an armed conflict.32 Boskoski can be 
read as standing for either one or two eminently pragmatic propositions. 
                                                                                                                      
Qaeda ties actually have little in common); see also Robin Geiß, Armed Violence in Fragile 
States: Low-Intensity Conflicts, Spillover Conflicts, and Sporadic Law Enforcement Operations by Third 
Parties, 91(873) INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 127, 134–35 (March 2009) 
(global Al Qaeda network structure appears “rather basic” and “rudimentarily organized”); 
cf. Ohlin, supra note 13 (offering more pragmatic view). 
27. Ohlin, supra note 13, at 11–12; Michael N. Schmitt, Unmanned Combat Aircraft Sys-
tems and International Humanitarian Law: Simplifying the Oft Benighted Debate, 30 BOSTON UNI-
VERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 595, 604–06 (2012) (discussing relationship be-
tween AP II and Common Article 3); cf. Andreas Paulus & Mindia Vashakmadze, Asym-
metrical War and the Notion of Armed Conflict – A Tentative Conceptualization, 91(873) INTER-
NATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 95, 117 (Mar. 2009) (discussing importance of 
flexibility in definition of an OAG). 
28. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, HOW IS THE TERM 
“ARMED CONFLICT” DEFINED IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW? 5 (2008), 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf. 
29. However, the ICRC has also indicated that the criteria mentioned in the ICTY ju-
risprudence are useful guides. See IHL CHALLENGES, supra note 7, at 8 (requiring a “cer-
tain level of organization,” which may include, but is not limited to, “the existence of a 
command structure . . . disciplinary rules . . . headquarters,” and logistical, attack, and ne-
gotiating capabilities).  
30. See Ohlin, supra note 13, at 14 (“legal support for [requiring] centralization is mis-
placed”); Michael N. Schmitt, The Status of Opposition Fighters in a Non-International Armed 
Conflict, in Non-International Armed Conflict in the Twenty-First Century 119, 129 (Ken-
neth Watkin & Andrew Norris eds., 2012) (Vol. 88, U.S. Naval War College International 
Law Studies) (arguing that group’s structure “need not be strictly hierarchical or imple-
mented in any formalistic manner”). 
31. Boskoski, supra note 24. 
32. Id. ¶ 185 (noting that terrorism may be part of NIAC if it is part of “protracted 
campaign”). 
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First, OAGs should not be assessed in a vacuum, but on a sliding scale that 
also includes the other Tadic criterion, intensity.33 Second, the best proof of 
an OAG is in the operational details of the violence that members of the 
group have caused. A group’s sheer ability to mount sustained terrorist at-
tacks is evidence of a “high level of planning and a coordinated command 
structure.”34 
The ICTY’s finding that evidence of discipline exists also suggests sub-
stantial flexibility in the definition of an OAG. In Limaj, for example, the 
ICTY found that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was organized even 
though evidence of discipline was “scant” by the court’s own admission.35 
Witnesses differed widely on when the military police cited by the tribunal 
had been established.36 If the military police were a salient symbol of organ-
izational discipline, this divergence in recollection seems odd. Moreover, as 
the ICTY acknowledged, there was no record of any imposition of disci-
pline among KLA members.37   
The Limaj court sought to buttress this decidedly equivocal evidence of 
discipline with a proxy: other nations and entities dealt with the KLA in a 
way that suggested that they regarded the group as organized,38 although 
evidence for this point was slim. For example, the ICTY acknowledged 
that representatives of States and other entities were “sometimes unclear 
about the KLA’s command structure.”39 Indeed, one report described the 
KLA’s structure as “a mystery” and “more a matter of diffuse horizontal 
command.”40 Limaj also noted that the General Staff of the KLA “did not 
have a consistent . . . location.”41 The Tribunal acknowledged that the au-
thorship and date of the KLA’s governing regulations were not apparent 
                                                                                                                      
33. Id. ¶¶ 182–83; see also Laurie R. Blank & Geoffrey S. Corn, Losing the Forest for the 
Trees: Syria, Law, and the Pragmatics of Conflict Recognition, 46 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW __ (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2029989, at 22–23 (discussing flexibility in ICTY approach); U.N.H.C.R., Independent Inter-
national Commission Report, supra note 20, ¶ 134 (asserting that anti-government armed 
groups in Syria should be considered OAGs that are accountable under LOAC). 
34. Boskoski, supra note 24, ¶ 204. 
35. Limaj, supra note 21, ¶ 116. 
36. Id. ¶ 113. 
37. Id. ¶ 116. 
38. See Limaj, supra note 21, ¶¶ 128–29. 
39. Id. ¶ 131 (citing Austrian Embassy report). 
40. Id. ¶ 131 (also observing that American diplomat Richard Holbrooke seconded 
this perception). 
41. Id. ¶ 104. 
 
 
 
 International Law Studies 2013 
64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
on the regulations’ face.42 Yet the ICTY brushed past these apparent fail-
ures of organization, explaining pragmatically that the KLA was “effective-
ly an underground operation, operating in conditions of secrecy out of 
concern to preserve its leadership” and “under constant threat of military 
action” by Serbian forces.43 Therefore, it was “no surprise that the organi-
zational structure and the hierarchy of the KLA was confusing.”44 More 
than any other factor, the court relied on the KLA’s knack for recruiting 
new followers.45 On the basis of this one criterion and modest evidence of 
others, the court was satisfied that the KLA’s fluid and contingent struc-
ture did not undermine its classification as an OAG.  
Precedent from elsewhere also argues against a narrow definition of or-
ganization. Consider Abella v. Argentina (Tablada Case),46 involving an attack 
on an Argentinean army base by rebels, followed by alleged State mistreat-
ment of the attackers that the plaintiffs characterized as a violation of 
Common Article 3. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) first ruled that AP II did not limit the situations in which armed 
conflict existed. The tribunal observed that armed conflicts “not of an in-
ternational character” that trigger Common Article 3 need not be “large-
scale and generalized hostilities or a situation comparable to a civil war in 
which dissident armed groups exercise control over parts of national terri-
tory.”47 Suggesting the need for flexibility, the IACHR noted that NIACs 
could also involve “confrontations between relatively organized armed forc-
es.”48 The tribunal’s use of the term “relatively” to modify the requirement 
of an OAG suggests that a narrow or rigid definition would be counter-
productive. While the tribunal added that an armed conflict must be some-
thing more than “riots, mere acts of banditry or an unorganized and short-
lived rebellion,”49 its analysis indicated that requiring a significantly more 
elaborate showing would merely allow parties to escape accountability. 
                                                                                                                      
42. Id. ¶ 110; see also id. ¶ 124 (discussing KLA’s lack of communications equipment). 
43. Id. ¶ 132; cf. Daniel Byman & Matthew C. Waxman, Kosovo and the Great Air Power 
Debate, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Spring 2000, at 25 (finding that KLA failed to show 
“that it was capable of holding territory against the Serbian Army”); id. at 28 (describing 
KLA as initially “poorly organized” and as gaining strength only with NATO assistance). 
44. Limaj, supra note 21, ¶ 132. 
45. Id. ¶ 118. 
46. Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, Report No. 55/97, ¶ 152 (Nov. 18, 1997) [hereinafter Tablada Case]. 
47. Id. ¶ 152. 
48. Id. (emphasis added). 
49. Id. 
 
 
 
Networks in Non-International Armed Conflicts Vol. 89 
 
65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Turning to the specific facts, the IACHR found it sufficient that the rebels’ 
attack on the base was “carefully planned, coordinated and executed.”50 
Tribunals have also expansively defined a non-State actor’s capacity to 
comply with LOAC. Terrorist groups generally do not comply with LOAC; 
often their standard operating procedure involves fundamental violations 
such as the targeting of civilians. But tribunals have viewed terrorist groups 
as able to comply with LOAC, even if those groups are disinclined to do 
so.51 A contrary view would create perverse incentives, allowing a group to 
free itself from the risk of targeting by increasing its violations of otherwise 
applicable norms.52  
Buttressing this flexible approach, the ICTY has also broadly interpret-
ed the Tadic requirement that violence be “protracted.” Interpreting the 
term “protracted” narrowly would again create perverse incentives. Violent 
non-State actors could strike first and then claim that the conflict was not 
yet a protracted one, thereby precluding a State from utilizing the full range 
of responses permissible under LOAC. Instead, the State would be limited 
to the far narrower repertoire of force permissible under a law enforcement 
paradigm. To avoid creating this perverse incentive, the ICTY has viewed 
the term “protracted armed violence” in a pragmatic fashion, as referring 
generally to the intensity of the violence, not its timing per se.53  
 
III. MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE: THE ORGANIZATION  
OF TERRORIST NETWORKS 
 
Just as a deeper look at case law suggests that the definition of OAG is 
more flexible than it initially appears, terrorist groups are more organized 
                                                                                                                      
50. Id. ¶ 155. While the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda set out a narrow-
er standard in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, that standard has generally not been followed and “is 
regarded as exceedingly high.” See Geiß, supra note 26, at 136 n.40. 
51. See Boskoski, supra note 24, ¶¶ 204–5 (pattern of LOAC violations does not sup-
port inference that group is unable to comply). 
52. Cf. id. at 205 (explaining that tribunal “cannot merely infer a lack of organization . 
. . [because] international humanitarian law was frequently violated by [the group’s] mem-
bers”). 
53. See Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 49 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008) (noting the term “protracted 
armed violence” has been “interpreted in practice… as referring more to the intensity of 
the armed violence than to its duration”); see also Tablada Case, supra not 46, ¶ 156 (noting 
that “brief duration” of attack did not preclude classification as NIAC); cf. Paulus & 
Vashakmadze, supra note 27, at 106–07 (arguing that Tadic “protracted armed violence” 
criterion refers to intensity as well as duration). 
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than their historical image suggests. Although some scholars have viewed 
earlier acts of terror as the product of individual discontent, they actually 
involved careful planning.54 Today’s terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, 
also display far more organization than is commonly understood. 
 
A. Terrorist Groups, Organization and Agency Costs 
 
Terrorist groups require organization because they wish to influence actors 
who are often organized. Terrorist groups play a multi-level game of the 
kind made famous by Robert Putnam, involving internal and external ac-
tors.55 Internal actors include people within the organization and within the 
community that the group purports to represent—Al Qaeda claims to 
stand for a particular religious vision, while a group like Hamas purports to 
represent Palestinians and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Kurds. Ex-
ternal actors include States where the terrorist group is principally located, 
other States where the group wishes to extend its influence, groups of 
States such as Western nations or States in the Middle East, international 
organizations, and other terrorist groups.56  
Terrorist groups use violence for both expressive and instrumental 
ends. Violence expresses their commitment to a distinctive vision that the 
mundane corruption of other parties obscures.57 Certain kinds of violence, 
such as suicide attacks, communicate this commitment in an even clearer 
form—sending a message about the group’s dedication to its cause.58 In-
strumentally, violence serves as a spoiler, derailing negotiations between 
States and moderate members of the group’s own community.59 On occa-
sion, terrorist groups find it expedient to mitigate violence, to avoid alienat-
                                                                                                                      
54. See Bruce Hoffman, The Myth of Grass Roots Terrorism (Book Review), 87(3) FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS 133, 135–36 (2008) (discussing careful organization behind assassination of 
Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, which precipitated World War I). 
55. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 
42 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 427 (1988). 
56. See Max Abrahms, What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism 
Strategy, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Spring 2008, at 85–86; Erica Chenoweth et al., What 
Makes Terrorists Tick?, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Spring 2009, at 83. 
57. See BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 168–69 (1998). 
58. See Abrahms, supra note 56, at 85–86. 
59. Cf. Andrew H. Kydd & Barbara F. Walter, The Strategies of Terrorism, INTERNA-
TIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2006, at 72–75 (explaining incentives for violent extremists to 
undermine peace negotiations). 
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ing key constituencies or to gain time to regroup from State pressure.60 
Managing violence to maximize both expressive and instrumental goals 
requires organization. Maintaining fidelity to these goals in the face of State 
pressure and internal disagreement requires a particular agility in organiza-
tional form. 
Like any other entity, a terrorist group needs some form of discipline. 
Without discipline, agency costs proliferate, as undisciplined members pur-
sue their own impulses or agendas to the detriment of the organization’s 
goals.61 However, discipline requires institutional memory, as leaders moni-
tor, document and assess the performance of subordinates. Documentation 
can be exploited by the group’s foes, providing information about opera-
tives and planned attacks. Terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, grapple 
with the conflict between uniform messaging and secrecy. 
Al Qaeda has coped with this dilemma by cultivating a portfolio ap-
proach that maximizes versatility in structure and decision making, as well 
as in operational plans.62 Wise investors use portfolio theory to diversify 
risk. The careful and prudent investor never entrusts all of her resources to 
one company or even one sector. Rather, the investor pursues some meas-
ure of risk diversification. If one investment fails to bring returns, others 
can pick up the slack.63  
Al Qaeda employs a portfolio approach to operations. Officials have 
recognized that Al Qaeda needs to be right only once to achieve its expres-
sive and instrumental goals, while security officials must be right every 
time.64  Running several plots simultaneously keeps State adversaries guess-
ing, lodging the initiative with Al Qaeda. Even if the vast majority of at-
tacks are prevented, one catastrophic attack sends the message that Al 
                                                                                                                      
60. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2729–30 (2010); cf. Peter 
Margulies, Advising Terrorism: Material Support, Safe Harbors, and Freedom of Speech, 63 HAS-
TINGS LAW JOURNAL 455, 486–93 (2012) (discussing manipulation of public opinion by 
terrorist groups). 
61. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation 
and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 509 (1994) (discussing 
virtues and risks of working through agents). 
62. Cf. Matthew C. Waxman, The Structure of Terrorism Threats and the Laws of War, 20 
DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW 429, 433–37 (2010) (distin-
guishing between “top-down” and “bottom-up” threats). 
63. See Lee-Ford Tritt, The Limitations of an Economic Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 32 
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 2579, 2622 (2011). 
64. See Frances Fragos Townsend, The President’s Plan, in 10 Ways to Avoid the Next 
9/11, NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006, § 4, 13. 
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Qaeda is still on the map. That message encourages further attacks and dis-
torts government policies. Al Qaeda uses a similar approach to organiza-
tional form. It varies its structure as the need requires, equipping its per-
sonnel to leverage “evolving relationships” rather than being wed to a par-
ticular organizational structure.65 Sticking with one organizational form 
would also give an advantage to Al Qaeda’s adversaries.66 Al Qaeda has 
adopted an approach to structure that minimizes this risk, mixing com-
mand decisions with subordinates’ operational initiative. While some have 
argued that most terrorist acts are the product of independent, grassroots 
efforts,67 that picture is decidedly incomplete. According to terrorism ex-
pert Bruce Hoffman, Al Qaeda is a “remarkably agile and flexible organiza-
tion that exercises both top-down and bottom-up planning and operational 
capabilities.”68  
Accounts of terrorist groups as creatures of chaos are inaccurate. It 
turns out that terrorist groups breed bureaucracy. Like lawful organizations, 
terrorist groups wrestle with the ubiquitous problem of agency costs. Al 
Qaeda, like a State military unit, uses personnel drawn from a variety of 
backgrounds whom it expects to fulfill the group’s mission.69 However, 
operatives may have agendas of their own. For example, they may have an 
interest in looting civilian property or skimming money from the group and 
enriching themselves.70 Alternatively, terrorist operatives may engage in 
more violence than the group’s leaders find optimal, because the operatives 
                                                                                                                      
65. See Reid Sawyer & Michael Foster, The Resurgent and Persistent Threat of al Qaeda, 618 
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL & SOCIAL SCIENCE 197, 200 (2008). 
66. See Abdulkader H. Sinno, Armed Groups’ Organizational Structure and Their Strategic 
Options, 93(882) INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 311, 318 (2011) (noting 
that networks such as Al Qaeda are less vulnerable to State retaliation because of the mo-
bile and dispersed nature of their leadership). 
67. See MARC SAGEMAN, LEADERLESS JIHAD: TERROR NETWORKS IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 23–24 (2008). 
68. Hoffman, supra note 54, at 134. 
69. Jacob N. Shapiro & David A. Siegel, Moral Hazard, Discipline, and the Management of 
Terrorist Organizations, 64 WORLD POLITICS 39, 73 (2012); see also John Mueller & Mark G. 
Stewart, The Terrorism Delusion: America’s Overwrought Response to September 11, INTERNA-
TIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2012 (arguing that individual defendants convicted in the 
United States of terrorism-related crimes were often lacking in competence and judgment); 
cf. Brahma Chellaney, Fighting Terrorism in Southern Asia: The Lessons of History, INTERNA-
TIONAL SECURITY, Winter 2001–02, at 96–97 (noting, as an example of agency costs in 
counterterrorism, that aid to South Asian governments and non-State groups to fight ter-
rorism has been siphoned off for other purposes).  
70. Shapiro & Siegel, supra note 69, at 54–55. 
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have developed habits of violence while leaders sometimes believe that rel-
ative restraint enhances the organizational brand.71 Bureaucratic rules and 
procedures can help the terrorist group address these problems. 
Consider the case of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). AQI was a “cohesive or-
ganization with shared personnel across ‘official’ names, institutional 
memory, embedded management practices, and permanent salaried em-
ployees.”72 Both AQI and its successor organization, the Islamic State of 
Iraq (ISI), took steps to enforce discipline among members.73 For example, 
terrorist groups such as AQI keep copious records of the success and fail-
ure of operations, even though maintaining such records greatly enhances 
the risk that adversaries will obtain custody of this information and use it 
against these groups.74 Groups such as AQI clearly believe that committing 
rules and communications to writing tightens the organization of the 
group, making defection or shirking more difficult. AQI required signed 
pledges by fighters who consented to conditions on various activities.75 For 
example, AQI threatened to expel members who engaged in ordinary crim-
inal conduct, such as looting, which would distract from the group’s ideo-
logical agenda.76 ISI instituted controls that would bring a glow to the most 
austere of accountants, decreeing that, “[f]or every amount paid out of [or-
ganizational] funds, the recipient is required to provide two signatures . . . 
one for receiving the money and another one to show how the money was 
spent.”77 Another ISI pronunciamento declared that “[a]ll properties, small 
and large, will be inventoried.”78 The ISI also required operatives to upload 
information on flash drives, to be “sent every week to the [group’s] admin-
istrator.”79 The proliferation of flash drives and memory sticks obviously 
ratchets up the risk that some of the information contained in these devices 
will end up in the hands of the group’s adversaries.80 However, ISI appar-
ently determined that the benefits of such a structure to group discipline 
outweighed those risks.  
                                                                                                                      
71. Cf. Mueller & Stewart, supra note 69, at 91 (asserting that Muslim population 
worldwide has been alienated by Al Qaeda’s indiscriminate violence).  
72. Shapiro & Siegel, supra note 69, at 48 n.32. 
73. Id. at 47. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 48. 
76. Id. at 49–50. 
77. Id. at 50. 
78. Shapiro & Siegel, supra note 69.  
79. Id. at 51. 
80. Id. at 50. 
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ISI also kept careful track of all of its operatives, cataloging incoming 
fighters, ongoing staff and “exiting brothers.”81 These internal records dis-
tinguished between the assignments of new staff, who might be suicide 
bombers or perform other roles.82 This record keeping, like the ban on 
looting, served strategic and ideological purposes. Operatives in Iraq were 
often foreign nationals who had entered Iraq because ISI’s practice of vio-
lence resonated with their preconceived beliefs or habits.83 Left to their 
own devices, these recruits might engage in violence “for its own sake.”84 
However, indiscriminate violence, like looting, could impair the group’s 
messaging. Record keeping also enhances the propaganda capabilities of 
terrorist groups. In most groups, claiming credit for an attack is as im-
portant as the attack itself.85 Claiming credit announces to the world and to 
other terrorist groups that the organization has “arrived.” Claiming credit 
for violence also enhances the group’s commitment: a suicide attack, for 
example, signals the sincerity of the attacker’s beliefs and those of the or-
ganization.  
One can also view a strategy relying on suicide attacks as a decision 
about the costs of internal monitoring. Suppose that a terrorist leader or-
ders a conventional (non-suicide) attack. For whatever reason, the attack 
fizzles. The group’s leadership then could have a difficult time in evaluating 
the causes for the attack’s failure in a “noisy” environment,86 where many 
factors can impede optimal execution. An attacker who survives a subop-
timal attack will likely have many excuses for why the operation failed to go 
as planned. The leader will need to weigh those excuses before deciding on 
the staffing for the next attack. A suicide attack dispenses with the excuse-
sifting phase, and also gives the suicide operative no exit strategy apart 
from outright desertion. Since that path leads to disgrace,87 a suicide attack 
                                                                                                                      
81. Id. at 51. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 52. 
84. Shapiro & Siegel, supra note 69. 
85. See Abrahms, supra note 56. 
86. See Shapiro & Siegel, supra note 69, at 73. 
87. This is a particularly compelling factor when groups also provide social services 
and cash benefits to operatives’ families. See Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief & 
Development, 549 F.3d 685, 698 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that Hamas’s social service pro-
grams “mak[e] it more costly . . . to defect”); Eli Berman & David D. Laitin, Religion, Ter-
rorism, and Public Goods: Testing the Club Model, 92 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1942, 
1952, 1955 (2008) (same); see also Justin Magouirk, The Nefarious Helping Hand: Anti-
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is often a good way of ensuring discipline. However, making sure that the 
operative has sufficient ties to the organization and a “track record” of vio-
lence and ideological commitment requires some degree of organization.  
 
B. Terrorist Networks and Global Reach  
 
Al Qaeda displays this mix of organizational forms in its relationships with 
affiliated groups.88 While Al Qaeda’s core remains in Pakistan, its lack of 
geographic proximity to other groups is not necessarily a weakness. Net-
work theory teaches us that physical proximity is less important when 
knowledge and values can be shared in other ways.89    
Links between Al Qaeda and regional groups are synergistic along a 
number of axes.  The Taliban/Al Qaeda link has been durable and effec-
tive because it combined the embedded localism of the Afghan Taliban 
with the extreme Islamist network of schools and camps based in Paki-
stan.90 In other situations, regional organizations seek out Al Qaeda when 
State pressure has weakened the organization.91 Allied with Al Qaeda, 
groups can share information on effective strategies and learn from their 
mistakes.92 Al Qaeda has historically welcomed such overtures, since they 
assist the global group in extending its brand.93 More sophisticated tech-
nology, including improvement in transportation and communications, has 
made it far easier to coordinate activities across regions.94  
                                                                                                                      
Corruption Campaigns, Social Services Provisions, and Terrorism, 20(3) TERRORISM & POLITICAL 
VIOLENCE 356, 358 (2008) (discussing Hamas’s provision of social services). 
88. For more on the strengths and weaknesses of networks, see Mette Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni & Calvert Jones, Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why al-Qaida May Be 
Less Threatening Than Many Think, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Fall 2008, at 11–33 (2008); 
see also Chesney, supra note 1, at 23–29 (discussing interaction and entropy in Al Qaeda’s 
relationships with groups in Yemen and Somalia). 
89. Stephen R. Borgatti & Rob Cross, A Relational View of Information Seeking and Learn-
ing in Social Networks, 49 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 432, 436, 439, 441 (2003). 
90. See Paul Staniland, Organizing Insurgency: Networks, Resources, and Rebellion in South 
Asia, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2012, at 171 (Summer 2012). 
91. Daniel L. Byman, Breaking the Bonds Between Al-Qa’ida and Its Affiliate Organizations 
14–15 (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files 
/papers/2012/7/alqaida%20terrorism%20byman/alqaida%20terrorism%20byman.pdf. 
92. Id. at 15. 
93. Id. at 13. 
94. See Jeremy Pressman, Rethinking Transnational Counterterrorism: Beyond a National 
Framework, 30(4) THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY 63, 64 (Autumn 2007). 
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Examples of this synergy abound. For example, Al Qaeda in the Arabi-
an Peninsula (AQAP), which operates primarily in Yemen, began as a result 
of “direct orders” from Osama bin Laden to Al Qaeda members on the 
ground in that region.95 Today, AQAP is both more “professional” in its 
operations and more linked to the Al Qaeda “core.”96 In North Africa, Al 
Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) enjoys a partnership with Al 
Qaeda.97 Al Qaeda’s current leader, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, announced a 
“blessed union” with AQIM, leading both groups to focus on attacking 
French interests.98 In Somalia, the terrorist group al Shabab publicly 
pledged its loyalty to Al Qaeda.99 Operatives trained in Afghanistan camps 
transferred to Somalia to provide training to Shabab members.100 The two 
organizations now cooperate on a host of matters, from ideological instruc-
tion to advanced tactics.101 Zarqawi’s AQI “willingly merged” with bin 
Laden’s group, although the latter had been weakened by the erosion of its 
base in Afghanistan after September 11.102 Credible evidence indicates that 
members of Al Qaeda in Iraq have been assigned to “establish cells in oth-
er countries.”103 
Al Qaeda provides training for operations elsewhere. For example, the 
perpetrators of the London subway suicide attacks obtained training from 
Al Qaeda branches in Pakistan.104 Indeed, Al Qaeda provided training in 
                                                                                                                      
95. See Leah Farrall, How Al Qaeda Works: What the Organization’s Subsidiaries Say About 
Its Strength, 90 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 128, 132 (2011); cf. Byman, supra note 91, at 5–6 (discuss-
ing relationship between Al Qaeda and AQAP); Jane Novak, Arabian Peninsula al Qaeda 
groups merge, LONG WAR JOURNAL, Jan. 26, 2009, http://www.longwarjournal.org 
/archives/2009/01/arabian_peninsula_al.php (same). 
96.  See Byman, supra note 91, at 6. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 7. 
101. Id. 
102. Farrall, supra note 95, at 133; cf. Matthew Levitt, Untangling the Terror Web: Identify-
ing and Counteracting the Phenomenon of Crossover Between Terrorist Groups, 24(1) SAIS Review 
33, 38–39 (Winter–Spring 2004).  
103. See Hoffman, supra note 54, at 135. The pattern of collaboration with Al Qaeda is 
not monolithic; members of some groups have broken away. See Byman, supra note 91, at 
7–8 (discussing Egypt’s Gama al-Islamiya, many of whose members renounced violence 
after influence of Al Qaeda led to widely criticized 1997 attack on tourists at Luxor). 
104. See Hoffman, supra note 54, at 138; Anthony N. Celso, Al Qaeda’s Post-9/11 Or-
ganizational Strategy: The Role of Islamist Regional Affiliates, 23 MEDITERRANEAN QUARTERLY 
30, 35 (2012); cf. Pressman, supra note 94, at 65 (“[f]undraising, recruitment . . . and train-
ing may take place in many countries simultaneously for transnational groups”). 
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Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen to as many as three thousand violent ex-
tremists from the United Kingdom, who subsequently returned, “em-
bedd[ed] themselves” in communities and developed plans for further at-
tacks.105 While discrimination and alienation from the mainstream in the 
United Kingdom and elsewhere may have facilitated additional recruitment, 
“much of the terrorist threat in the United Kingdom today stems from de-
liberate, long-standing subversion by al Qaeda.”106 Al Qaeda–linked net-
works released videotaped martyrs’ wills.107 Other plots, such as the con-
spiracy to target transatlantic passenger aircraft in 2006, also have ties to Al 
Qaeda networks in Pakistan or Yemen.108 Groups such as Hezbollah have 
global networks that attract financing and recruit new members.109 Moreo-
ver, some terrorist groups have strong links to transnational criminal enter-
prises that share the proceeds of drug trafficking, kidnapping and prostitu-
tion.110  
Groups partnering with Al Qaeda buy into a distinctive operational fo-
cus. While many groups have local agendas, groups under the Al Qaeda 
umbrella must agree to pursue attacks on Western interests.111 The attacks 
on Western interests are a signature element of Al Qaeda; perpetuating 
these attacks allows groups under the Al Qaeda umbrella to “stay on mes-
                                                                                                                      
105. See Hoffman, supra note 54, at 138. 
106. Id.  
107. Celso, supra note 104, at 35. 
108. Id. 
109. See Levitt, supra note 102, at 35. My point here is not that Hezbollah is affiliated 
with Al Qaeda, but that Al Qaeda may emulate Hezbollah’s worldwide financial activities. 
See Jonathan M. Winer, Countering Terrorist Finance: A Work, Mostly in Progress, 618 ANNALS 
OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL & SOCIAL SCIENCE 112, 116 (2008) (discuss-
ing Al Qaeda’s funding connections in Saudi Arabia). 
110. See Phil Williams, Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime: Nexus, Appropriation, or 
Transformation?, in COUNTERING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 126, 138–39 (Thomas J. 
Biersteker & Sue E. Eckert eds., Routledge 2008) (describing involvement of LTTE in 
heroin trade, human trafficking, gun running and extortion). 
111. Farrall, supra note 95, at 133; cf. Byman, supra note 91, at 11 (noting that “com-
mon consequence of the embrace of an [Al Qaeda] label is for a group to seek out West-
ern targets within a group’s theater of operations”); Pressman, supra note 94, at 65 (dis-
cussing proliferation of Osama bin Laden’s strategy of attacks on Western targets). David 
H. Petraeus, the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, recently told congres-
sional committees that Al Qaeda appears to have influenced the targeting of the American 
diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya that resulted in the deaths of Ambassador J. Chris-
topher Stevens and three other Americans. See Eric Schmitt, Petraeus Says U.S. Tried to 
Avoid Tipping Off Terrorists After Libya Attack, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 17, 2012, at A10. 
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sage.”112 Moreover, Al Qaeda insists on specific approval for attacks out-
side a subsidiary’s regional base.113 For example, when a Danish newspaper 
published caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad, Al Qaeda asked its Iraqi 
branch to carry out attacks on Danish interests.114  U.S. officials believe that 
Hezbollah operatives played a significant role in the July 2012 attack in 
Bulgaria on a bus carrying Israeli tourists.115 In addition, Al Qaeda requires 
certain operational modalities for attacks outside a branch’s region. Al 
Qaeda pushes suicide attacks and patterned attacks on particular kinds of 
targets, such as public transportation, government structures and infra-
structure.116 This layer of specific operational control demonstrates Al 
Qaeda’s organizational contours and confirms its existence and functioning 
as a “united front.”117 Al Qaeda also has structural mechanisms that ensure 
communication and guidance. It uses information committees that are tied 
to senior leadership and operational planners.118 
A networked approach driven by an anti-Western strategic focus has 
many advantages for Al Qaeda. Shared ideology lessens the likelihood of 
deterring the group through ordinary law enforcement or negotiation. Sui-
cide bombers will not blink at the prospect of arrest and trial. Rather, in-
volvement with the legal system confers another opportunity for the at-
tackers to brand themselves as martyrs.119 In addition, networks such as Al 
Qaeda and its affiliates are far less amenable to negotiation than territory-
based groups. Groups that control territory within a single State may on 
occasion be a party to successful negotiations, as the IRA demonstrated.120 
Such movements may gain a stake in negotiations, as they seek to ease State 
pressure on their territorial base.121 In contrast, the disaggregation of terri-
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tory and operations in transnational networks mean that those groups lack 
a “return address.” Since transnational groups can readily shift their opera-
tions,122 State pressure is not an effective deterrent. The absence of a gen-
eral deterrent only exacerbates the risk of armed conflict from transnational 
groups, and makes specific deterrence or incapacitation of the group’s op-
eratives all the more imperative.123  
On the basis of this analysis of terrorist and network organization, tar-
geting of an Al Qaeda affiliate is permissible on a showing that Al Qaeda 
exerts a strategic influence on the targeted group. A State considering tar-
geting members of the Al Qaeda subsidiary should have a reasonable basis 
for believing that Al Qaeda guides some or all of the group’s choice of tar-
gets. Mere subscription to an ideology is not enough—nor is financing, 
although financing can be one factor contributing to an inference of strate-
gic influence. Policymakers should have a reasonable belief that Al Qaeda 
has leveraged money, recruits, training or expertise to encourage the affili-
ate’s targeting of Western interests or moderation in the targeting of Mus-
lim civilians. Ongoing correspondence or exchanges of information about 
targeting or operations should give rise to an inference that such influence 
is present. Al Qaeda’s role in the training of an affiliate’s recruits should 
also have evidentiary significance.124 No rigid hierarchy need be shown—
indeed, as we have seen, the case law from transnational tribunals has often 
required less hierarchy than meets the eye.125   
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
  
One need not read the modern jurisprudence defining an OAG as being 
limited to groups with headquarters, fully functioning logistics or ironclad 
discipline. While the ICTY decisions include language setting out these cri-
teria, the facts of the cases are actually far more ambiguous. In judgments 
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such as Limaj, the ICTY found organization when traditional elements 
were equivocal. The ICTY jurisprudence and the analysis of many com-
mentators point toward a more pragmatic approach.  
That said, terrorist organizations often reveal surprisingly strong ele-
ments of organization. Like other entities, terrorist groups devise mecha-
nisms to deal with the problem of agency costs. They monitor, assess and 
document performance of their personnel, and make appropriate changes 
when needed. These measures exist even when they appear to endanger the 
groups’ security. 
The versatile approach to organization that marks terrorist groups 
within a State also holds true for transnational networks such as Al Qaeda. 
Al Qaeda operates in a synergistic fashion with regional groups. Many 
groups have received training from Al Qaeda’s core feeder sources of 
schools and camps, and have sworn allegiance to Al Qaeda to enhance 
their appeal and access to resources. Direct operational control is rarely 
present. However, strategic influence, including a focus on targeting West-
ern interests, is common. When such strategic influence can be shown, the 
definition of an OAG is sufficiently flexible to permit targeting across bor-
ders.  
 
 
